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This Note examines the justness of the Kear decision. The current provisions of the Extra-
dition Treaty, the powers of bounty hunters, and the role of the courts in regulating extradition
are discussed. The Note concludes that extradition was not only proper, but necessary in order to
maintain the Extradition Treaty’s goal of suppressing crime through cooperation between Canada
and the United States.
KEAR V HILTON: ENFORCING THE TREATY ON
EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and
Canada' (Extradition Treaty) governs all extradition proceed-
ings between the two countries.2 In 1981, two United States
bounty hunters, without benefit of a formal extradition re-
quest, went to Canada, apprehended a party who had failed to
appear for trial in the United States, and returned him to the
United States to stand trial.' Amidst much publicity-Putnam
County vs. Canada,4 A One-Man Diplomatic Flap,5 The not-so-happy
hunting ground,6 Handcuffs across the border 7 -Canadian authori-
ties sought to extradite them for kidnapping.' In Kear v.
Hilton,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit ruled that, despite the freedom generally allowed bounty
hunters in the United States,' 0 extradition was required."
This Note examines the justness of the Kear decision. The
current provisions of the Extradition Treaty,' 2 the powers of
bounty hunters,' 3 and the role of the courts in regulating ex-
1. Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 [here-
inafter cited as Extradition Treaty]. The Extradition Treaty provides that the United
States and Canada will extradite to the other all those who are charged with commit-
ting offenses covered by the Extradition Treaty, when the terms of the Extradition
Treaty are met. Extradition Treaty, supra, art. 1.
2. It has been held that apart from treaty obligations, there is no well-defined
obligation of one country to deliver up fugitives to another. See, e.g., United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). The United States extradition statute con-
tained in 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982), states that "[tihe provisions of this chapter relat-
ing to the surrender of persons who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall
continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such
foreign government." Id.; infra text accompanying notes 16-18.
3. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
4. Putnam County vs. Canada, Time, Aug. 8, 1983, at 58.
5. Strasser, A One-Man Diplomatic Flap, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 1983, at 28.
6. Posner, The not-so-happy hunting ground, Maclean's, Feb. 8, 1982, at 23.
7. Posner, Handcuffs across the border, Maclean's, July 25, 1983, at 6.
8. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
9. 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
10. For a discussion of the freedom allowed bounty hunters in the United States,
see infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
11. Kear, 699 F.2d at 185; see also infra note 108.
12. See infra notes 26, 49, 107, 129-30, 147-49 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
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tradition' 4 are discussed. The Note concludes that extradition
was not only proper, but necessary in order to maintain the
Extradition Treaty's goal of suppressing crime through coop-
eration between Canada and the United States.15
I. THE TREATY ON EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Extradition is governed by statute in the United States. 6
The law provides for "the surrender of persons who have
committed crimes in foreign countries . . .only during the
existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign govern-
ment." '7 Accordingly, the United States can extradite to a for-
eign country only when there exists a treaty on extradition with
that country.I'
A. The Development of the Treaty
The United States and Canada entered into the Extradi-
tion Treaty on December 3, 1971.' 9 Prior to the enactment of
the Extradition Treaty, extradition proceedings between the
United States and Canada were governed by article X of the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 Between the United States
and the United Kingdom20 (Webster-Ashburton Treaty). The
Webster-Ashburton Treaty provided for the extradition only
of persons who had committed one of a limited number of
offenses. 2' Although article X was repeatedly modified,22 it
14. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982).
17. Id.
18. The Supreme Court, in Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933), stated
that there is "no right to extradition apart from treaty." Id. at 287. In Ivancevic v.
Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954), the court specifi-
cally referred to § 3181 in holding that extradition to a foreign country may be ac-
complished only during the existence of a treaty with that country. Ivancevic, 211
F.2d at 566.
19. Extradition Treaty, supra note 1.
20. Aug. 9, 1842, United States-United Kingdom, art. X, 8 Stat. 572, 576, 12
Bevans 82, at 88 [hereinafter cited as Webster-Ashburton Treaty].
21. Article X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty stated:
It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall, upon
mutual requisitions by them or their Ministers, officers, or authorities, re-
spectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with
the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or
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arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed
within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found,
within the territories of the other: provided that this shall only be done
upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place
where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his
apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there
been committed; and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two
Governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint
made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or
person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other
magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be
heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed suf-
ficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or
magistrate to certify the same to the proper executive authority, that a war-
rant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such ap-
prehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who
makes the requisition and receives the fugitive.
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 20, art. X.
22. Article X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was modified by five supplemen-
tal agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom, and one between
the United States and Canada. The Supplementary Convention on Extradition, July
12, 1889, United States-United Kingdom, art. 1, 26 Stat. 1508, 1509, 12 Bevans 211,
at 212, added 10 extraditable offenses:
1. Manslaughter, when voluntary.
2. Counterfeiting or altering money; uttering or bringing into circulation
counterfeit or altered money.
3. Embezzlement; larceny; receiving any money, valuable security, or other
property, knowing the same to have been embezzled, stolen, or fraudulently
obtained.
4. Fraud by bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, or director or member or
officer of any company, made criminal by the laws of both countries.
5. Perjury, or subornation of perjury.
6. Rape; abduction; child-stealing; kidnapping.
7. Burglary; house-breaking or shop-breaking.
8. Piracy by the law of nations.
9. Revolt, or conspiracy to revolt by two or more persons on board a ship
on the high seas, against the authority of the master; wrongfully sinking or
destroying a vessel at sea, or attempting to do so; assaults on board a ship
on the high seas, with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
10. Crimes and offences against the laws of both countries for the suppres-
sion of slavery and slave-trading.
Id. art. 1. Additional offenses were added by: Supplementary Convention Between
the United States of America and Her Majesty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitive
Criminals, Oct. 26, 1951, United States-Canada, 3 U.S.T. 2826, T.I.A.S. No. 2454;
Convention in Respect of Canada for Extradition of Offenses Against Narcotic Laws,
Jan. 8, 1925, United States-Great Britain, 44 Stat. 2100, T.S. No. 719; Supplementary
Convention on Extradition, May 15, 1922, United States-Great Britain, 42 Stat. 2224,
T.S. No. 666; Supplementary Convention on Extradition, Apr. 12, 1905, United
States-Great Britain, 34 Stat. 2903, T.S. No. 458; Supplementary Treaty on Extradi-
tion, Dec. 13, 1900, United States-Great Britain, 32 Stat. 1864, T.S. No. 391.
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was deemed unsatisfactory 23 because it did not cover the full
range of offenses necessary to properly combat international
crime.2 4 One of the goals of the Extradition Treaty was "mod-
ernization of the extradition relations between the United
States and Canada ' 25 by increasing the number of extraditable
offenses to thirty.26
The Extradition Treaty was recently construed in Kear v.
23. Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1977). The court in Galanis
stated that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 20, was "rudimentary," and
was an unsatisfactory basis for extradition between the United States and Canada.
Galanis, 568 F.2d at 236.
24. The President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Treaty for Advice and Consent
to Ratification, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 120 CONG. REC.
31,090 (1974) (statement of Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States) [herein-
after cited as The President's Message].
25. Id.
26. Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, schedule. The offenses are:
1. Murder; assault with intent to commit murder.
2. Manslaughter.
3. Wounding; maiming; or assault occasioning bodily harm.
4. Unlawful throwing or application of any corrosive substances at or
upon the person of another.
5. Rape; indecent assault.
6. Unlawful sexual acts with or upon children under the age specified
by the laws of both the requesting and requested States.
7. Willful nonsupport or willful abandonment of a minor when such
minor is or is likely to be injured or his life is or is likely to be endangered.
8. Kidnapping; child stealing; abduction; false imprisonment.
9. Robbery; assault with intent to steal.
10. Burglary; housebreaking.
11. Larceny, theft or embezzlement.
12. Obtaining property, money or valuable securities by false pre-
tenses or by threat of force or by defrauding the public or any person by
deceit or falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether such deceit or false-
hood or any fraudulent means would or would not amount to a false pre-
tense.
13. Bribery, including soliciting, offering and accepting.
14. Extortion.
15. Receiving any money, valuable securities or other property know-
ing the same to have been unlawfully obtained.
16. Fraud by a banker, agent, or by a director or officer of any com-
pany.
17. Offenses against the laws relating to counterfeiting or forgery.
18. Perjury in any proceeding whatsoever.
19. Making a false affidavit or statutory declaration for any extrajudi-
cial purpose.
20. Arson.
21. Any act done with intent to endanger the safety of any person
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Hilton."7 However, the Kear decision was not without prece-
dent. The ruling in Kear 2 8 was very similar to that in the factu-
ally comparable case, Collier v. Vaccaro,29 which was decided
under article X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.
3 0
II. KEAR AND COLLIER: THE SIMILARITIES
A. Kear v. Hilton
1. Factual Background
Sidney L. Jaffe had lived in Canada since 1971 as a resi-
dent alien.3 In 1981, Jaffe was charged with conducting un-
lawful land sales practices in connection with a real estate de-
travelling upon a railway, or any aircraft or vessel or other means of trans-
portation.
22. Piracy, by statute or by law of nations; mutiny or revolt on board a
vessel against the authority of the captain or commander of such vessel.
23. Any unlawful seizure or exercise of control of an aircraft, by force
or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any other form of intimida-
tion, on board such aircraft.
24. Willful injury to property.
25. Offenses against the bankruptcy laws.
26. Offenses against the laws relating to the traffic in, production,
manufacture, or importation of narcotic drugs, Cannabis sativa L., halluci-
nogenic drugs, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine and its derivatives.
27. Use of the mails or other means of communication in connection
with schemes devised or intended to deceive or defraud the public or for the
purpose of obtaining money or property by false pretenses.
28. Offenses against federal laws relating to the sale or purchase of
securities.
29. Making or having in possession any explosive substance with in-
tent to endanger life, or to cause severe damage to property.
30. Obstructing the course ofjustice in ajudicial proceeding, existing
or proposed, by:
a) dissuading or attempting to dissuade a person by threats,
bribes, or other corrupt means from giving evidence;
b) influencing or attempting to influence by threat, bribes, or
other corrupt means a person in his conduct as a juror; or
c) accepting a bribe or other corrupt consideration to abstain
from giving evidence or to do or to refrain from doing anything as a
juror.
Id.
27. 699 F.2d 181, 183-85 (4th Cir. 1983).
28. For a discussion of the ruling of Kear, see infra notes 48-101, 112-15 and
accompanying text.
29. 51 F.2d 17, 19-21 (4th Cir. 1931).
30. Id. at 19; see supra note 21 (for text of article X).
31. Press, The Bounty-Hunter Mutiny, Newsweek, Aug. 30, 1982, at 58.
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velopment in Florida. 2 A professional bonding company, or
"surety, ' ' 33 posted bonds in the amount of U.S. $137,500 to
insure Jaffe's appearance for trial in Florida 4 After bail was
posted, Jaffe returned to Toronto, Canada, and obtained Ca-
nadian citizenship. 5
At the time of the trial in the spring of 1981, Jaffe re-
mained in Toronto, claiming he was not well enough to
travel. 6 In September 1981, DanielJ. Kear, a licensed bonds-
man, and agent of the surety, 37 and Timm Johnson, a profes-
sional bounty hunter,3 8 apprehended Jaffe while he was jog-
ging near his Toronto home.3 9 Forcing him into a car, they
drove across the border to Niagara Falls, New York. Kear and
Johnson then flew with Jaffe to Florida, where he was tried.4"
32. Florida Parole Board Votes to Free Canadian, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1983, at AI8,
col. 6.
33. A "surety" is defined as: "One who undertakes to pay money or to do any
other act in event that his principal fails therein." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293
(5th ed. 1979). A "surety company" is "[a] company, usually incorporated, whose
business is to assume the responsibility of a surety on the bonds of officers, trustees,
executors, guardians, etc., in consideration of a fee proportioned to the amount of
the security required." Id.
34. Kear, 699 F.2d at 181.
35. Press, The Bounty-Hunter Mutiny, Newsweek, Aug. 30, 1982, at 58.
36. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. v. State, 418 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
37. Kear, 699 F.2d at 182.
38. Id.
39. Press, The Bounty-Hunter Mutiny, Newsweek, Aug. 30, 1982, at 58. There ap-
pears to be a question of exactly who did what when Jaffe was apprehended. Accord-
ing to Kear, "Johnson may have posed as a member of the Ontario police force," 699
F.2d at 185, while another source notes that both "bounty hunters [were] posing as
Canadian police officers." Canadian, Kidnapped to Stand Trial in Florida, Is Freed on Bond,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at A14, col. 3.
40. Kear, 699 F.2d at 182. Jaffe was convicted on the charges of unlawful land
sales practices and sentenced to 35 years in the Avon Park Correctional Institution.
Strasser, A One-Alan Diplomatic Flap, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 1983, at 28. The Fifth District
of the Florida Court of Appeals overturned Jaffe's conviction on the grounds that the
jury had been misdirected and that "prosecutors had failed to charge a crime when
they drew up the original documents." Canadian, Kidnapped to Stand Trial in Florida, Is
Freed on Bond, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at A14, col.3; see Jaffe v. State, 438 So. 2d
72, 75-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). However, the court left standing the count on
failing to appear for trial, which carried a five-year sentence. SeeJaffe, 438 So. 2d at
76; Canadian, Kidnapped to Stand Trial in Florida, Is Freed on Bond, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
1983, at A14, col. 3.
In October 1983, the Florida Parole and Probation Commission approved Jaffe's
release. Florida Parole Board Votes to Free Canadian, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1983, at A18,
col. 6. However, because bond had not yet been posted on a remaining charge of
organized fraud, he was ordered into the custody of Putnam County officials. Id.
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Canadian officials were outraged by the incident,4' charg-
ing that it made a "mockery of the extradition treaty between
the [United States and Canada]." 4 2 Consequently, Canada
sought to extradite Kear, charging him with violation of sec-
tion 247(1)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code,4 which makes
it a crime to kidnap a person with the intent to send or trans-
port the person out of Canada against his will. 4 4 In an attempt
to avoid extradition, Kear petitioned the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for a writ of habeas
corpus."5 The court denied the petition,"6 and its ruling was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
4 7
2. The Fourth Circuit's Holding in Kear v. Hilton
Under the United States extradition statute,48 Canada's re-
quest for extradition of Kear from the United States could be
granted only if the terms of the Extradition Treaty were met. 49
Kidnapping is among the extraditable offenses listed in the Ex-
tradition Treaty.5 ° The crime of kidnapping as defined in both
Bond was then posted in the amount of U.S. $150,000, and Jaffe was released. The
remaining fraud charge is still pending. Canadian, Kidnapped to Stand Trial in Florida, Is
Freed on Bond, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at A14, col. 3.
41. Strasser, A One-Man Diplomatic Flap, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 1983, at 28.
42. Id.
43. Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1983).
44. Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 247(l)(b) (1970). Section
247(l)(b) reads in pertinent part: "Every one who kidnaps a person with intent...
to cause him to be unlawfully sent or transported out of Canada against his will, .
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life." Id.
45. Kear, 699 F.2d at 181. "While, in the United States, no appeal lies from the
decision of the extradition magistrate committing the accused for surrender, the ac-
cused may challenge the legality of his detention by means of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus." 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1014 (1968).
46. See Kear, 699 F.2d at 185.
47. Id.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982); see supra note 2 (for text of statute).
49. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2(1). Article 2(1) reads in full:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty for
any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which is an
integral part of this Treaty, provided these offenses are punishable by the
laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year.
Id.
50. Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, schedule; see supra note 26 (for text of
schedule).
1984]
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the United States 5' and Canadian 52 statutes includes the un-
lawful transport of someone out of the country. Thus, the stat-
utes were deemed sufficiently similar for the Extradition
Treaty to be applicable.53
a. The Lack of Mutuality Argument
The Extradition Treaty requires a mutuality between two
statutes.54  The alleged crime must be punishable under the
laws of both countries by a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year.55 Despite the similarity between the United States
and Canadian kidnapping statutes, 56 Kear contended that ex-
tradition would be improper because the Extradition Treaty
requirement of mutuality had not been met. Kear argued that
it would not be a crime under United States law if a Canadian
bondsman seized a bail jumper in the United States and re-
turned him to Canada. 57 Thus the required mutuality between
the United States and Canadian kidnapping statutes was not
present.
58
Kear's argument was based on the "extraordinary pow-
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1982). Section 1201(a) reads in full:
Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or
carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, ex-
cept in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce;
(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States;
(3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 101 (36) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1301(36)); or
(4) the person is a foreign official, an internationally protected person,
or an official guest as those terms are defined in section 1116(b) of this title,
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Id.
52. Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 247(1)(b) (1970); see supra note
44 (for text of statute).
53. Kear, 699 F.2d at 184.
54. Id. at 183. A mutuality between the statutes is a "reciprocation" or "in-
terchange" between them. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 920 (5th ed. 1979).
55. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2(1); supra note 49 (for text of article
2(1)). For a crime to be punishable it is "capable of being punished by law or right."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (5th ed. 1979).
56. See supra notes 44, 51.
57. Kear, 699 F.2d at 183.
58. Id.
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ers" 59 that professional bondsmen hold in theUnited States to
compel the return of a bail jumper.6 ° The common law right
of recapture was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court over 100 years ago in Taylor v. Taintor.6 ' The Supreme
Court in Taylor held that sureties are regarded as having cus-
tody of their principals after posting bail.6 2 Thus, in order to
secure his principal's appearance in court, a surety may seize
the principal at any time without obtaining a warrant.
63
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected
Kear's argument.64 The court noted that "[t]he rationale ad-
vanced [by Kear] . . . depend[ed] solely on cases relating to
seizures within the United States for return to appear before a
59. Id. at 182. For a discussion as to what is meant by the extraordinary powers
of bondsmen, see imfa note 60.
60. The court in Maynard v. Kear, 474 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979), ex-
plained the relationship between the bondsman and his principal:
The bondsman, in exchange for a fee and according to a contract, provides a
service, obtaining the principal's release from imprisonment. To obtain the
principal's release, the bondsman must pledge to a court that the bondsman
will assume responsibility for securing the appearance of the accused at trial.
The bondsman thus owes a duty to the court and must suffer financial pen-
alty for failure to perform that duty. In order to secure the principal's ap-
pearance at future court proceedings, the bondsman has the right pursuant
to the bail contract or common law to arrest the principal at any time and at
any place and to redeliver the principal into the hands of the public
jailor. . . . In making the rearrest, the bondsman need not obtain a war-
rant, can use agents, can use force, if necessary, and can pursue the principal
into any state and bring him back for trial without obtaining extradition,
unless there is a contrary state statute. . . . In sum, the bondsman merely
continues the original imprisonment, albeit in a more comfortable condition
for the principal.
Id. at 801-02 (footnote and citations omitted).
61. 83 U.S. (I Wall.) 366 (1872). In Taylor, sureties posted bail for their princi-
pal, charged with grand larceny, in Connecticut. Id. at 368. The principal left the
state, and went to New York. While there, he was delivered to authorities from
Maine regarding a prior burglary charge. Id. He was tried and imprisoned in Maine,
and thus could not appear before the Connecticut court at the time of his trial there.
Id. at 368-69. The Court ruled that the sureties were not to be discharged from
liability for failing to produce their principal. Id. at 372-75. They permitted him to
go to New York and it was their duty "to be aware of his arrest when it occurred, and
to interpose their claim to his custody." Id. at 373 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 371.
63. Id. But see .Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 802. -[T]he common law right of recap-
ture is limited by the reasonable means necessary to effect the rearrest." When the
bondsman is acting under the cloak of state authority, the common law right of re-
capture is also circumscribed by the fourth amendment prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. Kear, 699 F.2d at 183.
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federal or state court. '6 5 It refused to extend the authority to
act directly, without recourse to public authorities,6" when the
crossing of an international boundary was involved.67 In sup-
port of this position, the court cited Reese v. United States."8 The
Supreme Court in Reese held that the power of sureties over
principals did not extend outside the United States. 69 In Reese,
the defendant, who had posted bail, stipulated with the gov-
ernment that he could leave the United States prior to his ap-
pearance for trial. 7' Accordingly, the government could not
recover against the sureties for failing to produce their
principal. 7'
Reese may be distinguished from Kear in that, in Kear, the
government did not give Jaffe permission to leave the coun-
try. 72 However, this factual distinction does not undermine
the rule of law stated in Reese, restricting the powers of sureties
to the United States. 73 The Kear court had a firm basis for stat-
ing that the United States kidnapping statute would apply if a
Canadian bondsman seized a bail jumper in the United States
and returned him to Canada. 4 This, in turn, destroyed Kear's
contention "that, reciprocally treated, his conduct was not a
crime under [United States] law. ' ' 75 Furthermore, the court
65. Id.
66. Id. at 182.
67. Id. at 183.
68. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 (1869).
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 15-16.
71. Id. at 22.
There is . . .an implied covenant on the part of the government, when the
recognizance of bail is accepted, that it will not in any way interfere with this
covenant between [the surety and the principal], or impair its obligation, or
take any proceedings with the principal which will increase the risks of the
sureties or affect their remedy against him.
Id.
72. Compare Kear, 699 F.2d at 181-82 with Reese, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 at 22.
73. The Reese court stated that the bondsman's "power of arrest can only be
exercised within the territory of the United States." 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 at 21. It did
not qualify this rule, and in fact, emphasizes that the sureties cannot be held liable
because the government "itself consented to [the principal's] placing himself beyond
their reach and control." Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
74. Kear, 699 F.2d at 183.
75. Id. at 183-84. As further authority for the proposition that violation of the
sovereignty of a foreign state is prohibited, the court cited Villareal v. Hammond, 74
F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934). However, this case may be distinguished from Kear in that
the persons who "abducted" an escaped bond defaulter from Mexico were not
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pointed out that in Canada, as opposed to the United States,
there are statutory limits on bonding.7 6 One example is sec-
tion 127(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code,7 7 which prohibits a
surety from accepting any compensation for his services.78 In
addition, section 449(3) of the Code7 1 mandates that "[a]ny
one other than a peace officer who arrests a person without
warrant shall . . . deliver the person to a peace officer."80
Thus, Kear allegedly violated not only the Canadian law
against bonding for compensation, 8' but also the law requiring
delivery to a peace officer before return to a distant court. 8 2
Kear also argued that because Canadian law would allow a
bondsman to capture and return a bail jumper to a United
States court, he had not violated the Canadian kidnapping stat-
bondsmen, but merely persons attempting to obtain a reward for the defaulter's re-
turn, without delivering him first to the Mexican authorities. See id. at 504-05.
76. Kear, 699 F.2d at 182 n.3, 184.
77. Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 127(1) (1972).
78. Id. Section 127(1) reads in full:
Every one who willfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or de-
feat the course of justice in a judicial proceeding,
(a) by indemnifying or agreeing to indemnify a surety, in any way and
either in whole or in part, or
(b) where he is a surety, by accepting or agreeing to accept a fee or any
form of indemnity whether in whole or in part from or in respect of a person
who is released or is to be released from custody, is guilty of
(c) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years, or
(d) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Id.
79. Id. ch. C-34, § 449(3) (2d Supp. 1972).
80. Id. Section 702 of the Canadian Criminal Code states that "[n]othing in this
Part limits or restricts any right that a surety has of taking and giving into custody any
person for whom, under a recognizance, he is a surety." Criminal Code, CAN. REV.
STAT. ch. C-34, § 702 (1970). The Kear court recognized that this section "pre-
serve[s] the common law right of a surety to seize the accused and deliver him to a
justice," but "nevertheless section 449 of the Canadian Criminal Code" must con-
trol. Kear, 699 F.2d at 182 n.3.
81. See Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 127(l) (1972); supra notes
77-78 and accompanying text.
82. See Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 449(3) (2d Supp. 1972);
supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. The term "kidnapping" is not actually
defined in the Canadian Criminal Code and Canadian courts have not given a defini-
tion. See K. CLARKE, R. BARNHORST & S. BARNHORST, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CANA-
DIAN CRIMINAL CODE 210 (1977). However, in R. v. Reid, [1972] 2 All E.R. 1350,
(C.A.), the court ruled that the crime is "complete when the person is seized or car-
ried away." Id. at 1352. This criterion would appear to be satisfied in Kear, 699 F.2d
at 182.
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ute.8 3 In addressing this argument, the court noted that Kear's
actions probably violated Canadian law.84 The authority for
this contention was the Fourth Circuit's earlier decision in Col-
lier v. Vaccaro.85 Vaccaro was an informer working with a nar-
cotics agent of the United States government. 86 Under an ar-
rangement between United States and Canadian authorities,
Vaccaro and the narcotics agent worked in Canada to develop
evidence regarding an international smuggling operation.
8 7
Eventually, Vaccaro forcibly arrested the alleged head of the
smuggling ring and brought him into the United States.88 The
Collier court ruled that Vaccaro violated the Canadian kidnap-
ping statute 9 because there was sufficient evidence to support
Canada's argument that he had forcibly carried the suspect
into the United States. 0
In addition to relying on Collier, the Kear court noted that
Canadian authorities had instituted kidnapping charges and
extradition proceedings against Kear.9' According to the
court, it was the function of Canadian courts to determine
whether Canadian law had been violated.92 In refusing to
''preempt the Canadian courts" and "restrict the application of
the [Extradition] Treaty," the court pointed to Factor v. Lauben-
heimer.93 The Supreme Court held in Factor that in order to
83. Kear, 699 F.2d at 183; see Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 247(1)
(b) (1970); supra note 44 (for text of statute).
84. Kear, 699 F.2d at 184. The court does not actually state that Kear's conduct
would most likely violate Canadian law, but this can be inferred from the fact that the
court discusses a case in which conduct analogous to Kear's was held to have violated
Canadian law. Cf id. at 184 (citing Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931)).
85. 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931).
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The kidnapping statute then in effect reads as follows: "Every one is guilty
of an indictable offense and liable to twenty-five years' imprisonment who, without
lawful authority, . . . kidnaps any other person with intent . . . to cause such other
person to be unlawfully sent or transported out of Canada against his will." Criminal
Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 36, § 297(a)(ii) (1927). This is very similar to the current
section 247(1)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 247(1)
(b) (1970); see supra note 44 (for text of statute).
90. 51 F.2d at 19.
91. Kear, 699 F.2d at 184.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). In Factor, the ac-
cused's extradition to London was sought on the grounds that he had received
money which he knew had been fraudulently obtained. Id. at 286. The accused con-
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conform with the principles controlling international agree-
ments,94 treaties were to be construed so as to reflect the in-
tentions of both parties.95 Equality between the countries was
not to be sacrificed in the process of interpreting treaty obliga-
tions.96 Had the Kear court undertaken to interpret Canadian
law, it would have been narrowing the rights that Canada could
claim under the Extradition Treaty.97
Kear also argued that Jaffe's act of posting bail was a con-
sent to his recapture at any time.9" Thus, returning him to
Florida was not "kidnapping. '" 9 The court rejected this argu-
ment, 10 stating that it was "at best, a question to be raised by
way of defense in the Canadian criminal proceedings.'' °
B. A Comparison of the Defenses in Kear and Collier v. Vaccaro
Although Collier v. Vaccaroi0 2 was decided more than fifty
years before Kear v. Hilton,'0 3 the two cases are markedly simi-
lar. Each case involved Canadian government charges of kid-
napping, 0 4 and in both, the extradition proceedings were gov-
tended that such an act would not be a crime under the laws of the state of Illinois,
and thus, according to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 20, extradition
would not be proper. Factor, 290 U.S. at 286. The Court ruled that:
Once the contracting parties are satisfied that an identified offense is gener-
ally recognized as criminal in both countries, there is no occasion for stipu-
lating that extradition shall fail merely because the fugitive may succeed in
finding, in the country of refuge, some state, territory or district in which the
offense charged is not punishable.
Id. at 300.
94. These principles are that the "diplomatic relations between nations, and the
good faith of treaties," require that treaty obligations should be construed "so as to
effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between
them." Factor, 290 U.S. at 293.
95. Id. at 293-94.
96. See id. at 293.
97. In the words of the Kear court, "(w]e should not rush to insert ourselves and
possibly preempt the Canadian courts who doubtless are better prepared to answer
the question than we are. We should be slow to restrict the application of the Treaty
in that fashion." Kear, 699 F.2d at 184.
98. Id. at 183.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 184-85.
101. Id. at 185.
102. 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931). For a detailed discussion of the facts of Collier,
see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
103. 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
104. See supra notes 44, 89 and accompanying text.
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erned by treaty provisions."0 5 Interpreting the relevant stat-
utes 1 16 and treaty provisions,10 7 the courts in both Collier and
105. Kear's actions were governed by the Extradition Treaty, supra note 1. In
Collier, Vaccaro's actions were governed by article X of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty, supra note 20; see Collier, 51 F.2d at 19.
106. The statutes in Kear were 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1982), and § 247(1)(b) of
the Canadian Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34, § 247(1)(b) (1970). In Collier,
the statutory construction involved § 297(a)(ii) of the Canadian Criminal Code, CAN.
REV. STAT. ch. 36, § 297(a)(ii) (1927), and the kidnapping statute of Maryland, MD.
ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 316 (1924) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 337
(1957)). The Maryland statute provided that:
Every person, his counsellors, aiders or abettors, who shall be convicted of
the crime of kidnapping and forcibly or fraudulently carrying or causing to
be carried out of this State any person with intent to have such person car-
ried out of this State, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not more
than twenty-one years.
Id.
107. At the time Collier was decided, article X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty,
supra note 20, governed extradition proceedings between the United States and Ca-
nada. As a result of the Supplementary Convention on Extradition of 1899 between
the United States and the United Kingdom, supra note 22, kidnapping was added as
an extraditable offense. Id. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty provided that extradi-
tion was proper "upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the
place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his appre-
hension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had been there commit-
ted .. " Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 20, art. X.
This provision is akin to article 10(1) of the current Extradition Treaty, supra
note 1; see also infra note 129 (for text of article 10(1)). Despite the almost identical
language in both treaties concerning "the laws of the place where the person shall be
found," in Kear, the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1982), was used to define
kidnapping, while in Collier, the state statute of Maryland was used. Compare Kear, 699
F.2d at 183 with Collier, 51 F.2d at 19. This apparent inconsistency can be explained.
First, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, supra note 20, did not contain a provision
similar to article 2(1) of the current Extradition Treaty, which states that the offenses
must be punishable by "the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprison-
ment exceeding one year." Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2(1); see supra note
49 (for text of article 2(1)). Thus, the Extradition Treaty "commands reference to
the laws of the 'Contracting Parties,' " the United States and Canada. Cucuzzella v.
Keliikoa, 638 F.2d 105, 107 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981). These laws have been construed as
meaning "similar criminal provisions of federal law or, if none, the law of the place
where the fugitive is found or, if none, the law of the preponderance of the states."
Id. at 107.
Secondly, Collier follows the interpretation of article X of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty given in Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205 (1904). The Court in Pettit stated that:
-[T]he required evidence as to the criminality of the charge against the accused must
be such as would authorize his apprehension and commitment for trial in that State
of the Union in which he is arrested." Id. at 217; see Collier, 51 F.2d at 19 (the state
statute is used to define kidnapping). However, in Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276 (1933), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether "extradition may not
be had unless the offense charged is a crime under the law of the state where the
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Kear reached the conclusion that extradition was proper. 0 8
The similarities between the cases extend to the defenses
invoked by the parties.0 9 In Collier, the court recognized Vac-
caro's contention that "in attempting to apprehend [the smug-
gler], [he] was operating under [the] instructions of his supe-
rior and . . . with the sanction of the Canadian authorities."'' 0
However, the court held that whether Vaccaro believed he was
acting lawfully was immaterial when his conduct reflected the
elements of the kidnapping offense."' In Kear, the court con-
sidered the broad powers of professional bondsmen in the
fugitive is found" under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Id. at 286. The Court
stated that:
It cannot be said that these words give any clear indication that a fugitive
charged with acts constituting a crime named in the treaty is not to be sub-
ject to extradition unless those acts are also defined as criminal by the laws
of the state in which he is apprehended. The proviso would appear more
naturally to refer to the procedure . . . in conformity with local law, by
which compliance with the obligation of the treaty may be exacted at the
place of refuge; and sets up a standard by which to measure the amount of
the proof of the offense charged which the treaty requires as prerequisite to
extradition.
Id. at 290-91.
Thus, "the proviso of [a]rticle X relates to the procedure to be followed in as-
serting rights under the treaty and is not a limitation upon the definition of offenses
with respect to which extradition might be demanded." Id. at 296.
The approach taken by Kear is in accordance with article 2(1) of the Extradition
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2(l), and with the broader approach urged by Factor, "that
construction should be adopted that enlarges the rights of the parties under the
treaty." Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 850 (1st Cir. 1980).
108. The Collier court held that extradition was justified because Vaccaro "had
no right to carry [the alleged smuggler] forcibly out of Canada and into the United
States." Collier, 51 F.2d at 19. The Kear court held that "circumstances justifying
extradition [had] been established," Kear, 699 F.2d at 185, due to the mutuality be-
tween the Canadian and United States kidnapping statutes. Id. at 184.
109. Both defendants invoked the defense that they believed they were acting
lawfully. See Kear, 699 F.2d at 185; Collier, 51 F.2d at 19; infra notes 110-15 and ac-
companying text.
110. 51 F.2d at 20-21.
11. Id. at 19-20. Specifically, the court stated:
[I]t is no defense to the crime of kidnapping that an accused may have
thought that he had a right to arrest and carry the person arrested out of the
country or that he did not intend to violate the law. The gist of the offense
is the forcible carrying out of the state; and where this intention is shown to
have existed, it is immaterial that accused may have thought that he was
acting within the law.
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United States" 2 and acknowledged that "[t]he Canadian court
may listen sympathetically to Kear as he seeks to portray him-
self as someone caught in a complexity of intricate interna-
tional law beyond his imagination or comprehension."' 13 Nev-
ertheless, since there was "mutuality between the [Canadian
and United States] statutes"' " there were no "grounds for re-
fusing to honor the Canadian request for extradition."'
The problem of whether a writ of habeas corpus can be
used to prevent the extradition of a person who alleges that he
believed he was acting lawfully was illustrated in 1931 by Col-
lier.' 6 More than fifty years later, the problem arose again in
Kear and was handled by the Fourth Circuit in substantially the
same manner." ' The issue to be considered in this Note is
whether the Kear court was correct.
III. CONSIDERING THE FACTORS AS TO KEAR 'S
EXTRADITION
Bounty hunters play a critical role in insuring that defend-
ants facing criminal charges will appear in court.' 18 As such,
bounty hunters have been vested with broad powers by the
United States government." 9 Yet these powers stem from a
common law right, 120 and are not delineated by statute.'2
Thus, there may be legitimate doubt as to whether these pow-
ers extend across international boundaries.' 22
This uncertainty is complicated by factors in the Kear case
which lend some credence to Kear's argument that he believed
he was acting lawfully. 123 Under the Extradition Treaty, Flor-
ida could have requested Jaffe's extradition when he failed to
112. See Kear, 699 F.2d at 182. For a discussion of the powers of bondsmen in
the United States, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
113. Kear, 699 F.2d at 185.
114. Id. at 184.
115. Id. at 185.
116. See Collier, 51 F.2d at 19-21; supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
117. See Kear, 699 F.2d at 185; supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 60.
119. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Although circumscribed by case law, see supra notes 68-69 and accompany-
ing text, and constitutional principles, see supra note 63, the powers of bondsmen are
"seemingly absolute." Maynard, 474 F. Supp. at 802.
123. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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appear for trial. 124 However, the extradition pleas were twice
improperly drawn and rejected by the state. 12 5 At that point,
according to testimony by a lawyer for Accredited Surety &
Casualty Co,, the surety, "local prosecutors encouraged the
company to take the law into its own hands."' 26 The company
then sent Kear and Johnson to Toronto to bring Jaffe back.
127
While the State of Florida's involvement has never been
proven, the possibility exists that Kear went to Toronto not
only with the sanction of his employer, but with that of certain
state officials. ' 2
8
If so, Kear could have believed he was acting within the
law. The question remains, however, whether this defense
should have been sufficient to prevent Kear's extradition to
Canada, or whether it was merely an issue to be raised in the
Canadian proceeding.
A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus and Extradition
The Extradition Treaty states that extradition shall be
granted only if the evidence justifies committal for trial. 129
The Extradition Treaty does not state that the evidence must
be sufficient for conviction. 30  In Benson v. McMahon,' 3 1 the
Supreme Court defined the standard for use of a habeas
124. See Putnam County vs. Canada, Time, Aug. 8, 1983, at 58.
125. Press, The Bounty-Hunter Mutiny, Newsweek, Aug. 30, 1982, at 58.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Putnam County vs. Canada, Time, Aug. 8, 1983, at 58.
.128. In a petition for habeas corpus filed in June 1983 with the United States
district court in Jacksonville, Florida, the Canadian government asked for Jaffe's re-
lease from prison, charging that Kear and Johnson acted "pursuant to a plan pro-
moted by officials of the state of Florida." Posner, Handcuffs across the border,
Maclean's, July 25, 1983, at 6.
It has also been reported that "one ofJaffe's abductors ... admitted that he had
conferred with the state attorney's office before his trip to Toronto." Posner, The not-
so-happy hunting ground, Maclean's, Feb. 8, 1982, at 23.
129. Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10(1).
Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found' sufficient, accord-
ing to the laws of the place where the person sought shall be found, either to
justify his committal for trial if the offense of which he is accused had been
committed in its territory or to prove that he is the identical person con-
victed by the courts of the requesting State.
Id.
130. See id.
131. 127 U.S. 457 (1888). The issue before the Court was whether there were
grounds to justify extradition to Mexico under the terms of the United States' extra-
dition treaty with Mexico, or whether a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
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corpus proceeding in challenging an extradition order. 132 The
Court held that the question was not whether the party was
guilty or innocent of the specific crime involved, but simply
whether there was enough evidence to warrant committal for
trial. "' Several years later, in Ornelas v. Ruiz,'134 the Court re-
fined the law even further:
[I]t is settled that a writ of habeas corpus cannot perform the
office of a writ of error, and that, in extradition proceed-
ings, if. . . the offence charged is within the terms of the
treaty of extradition, and the magistrate. . . has before him
competent legal evidence on which to exercise his judgment
as to whether the facts are sufficient to establish the crimi-
nality of the accused for the purposes of extradition, such
decision cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus.' 35
In reviewing denials of petitions for writs of habeas corpus
to thwart extradition, the courts have not strayed from the
guidelines set out in Benson and Ornelas.'36 The Second Cir-
cuit3 v has recently reiterated that on appeal from the denial of
habeas corpus, the concern of the court is only whether the
"alleged offenses were covered by an extradition treaty and
whether an official with jurisdiction was presented with any evi-
dence warranting a finding that there was reasonable ground
to believe appellants guilty.' 38 Kear's conduct came within
the bounds of both the United States and Canadian kidnap-
ping statutes; 139 this was sufficient to establish his "criminality
. . . for the purposes of extradition."' 40
132. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
133. Benson, 127 U.S. at 463.
134. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
135. Id. at 508-09.
136. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Collins v. Loisel,
259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 456 (1913); Terlinden
v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 278 (1902); Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir.
1981); Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1980).
137. Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 79.
139. See supra notes 48-82 and accompanying text.
140. Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 508-09. The court in Benson, 127 U.S. at 463, explained
that:
[T]he proceeding before the commissioner is not to be regarded as in the
nature of a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted
of the crime charged against him, but rather of the character of those pre-
liminary examinations which take place every day . . . for the purpose of
determining whether a case is made out which justify the holding of the
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B. The Question of United States-Canadian Relations
Although the prior case law establishing the grounds for a
writ of habeas corpus to prevent extradition presents a strong
argument in favor of Kear's extradition, there is another, per-
haps even more compelling argument.
Treaty obligations represent "the most consistent and
most comprehensive effort. . . to co-operate with other States
in the suppression of fugitive criminals."' 4' While there is nat-
ural anxiety about being sent to a foreign country for trial,'
42
[i]t is upon the spot where the crime is committed that it can
best be tried and punished. There are the witnesses, and
there can the circumstances be most accurately ascertained
and considered. . . . [I]t is at the place where the offence
was committed that the greatest interest is felt in its detec-
tion and punishment, and the moral effect of retribution
most necessary and useful. 14
3
The cooperation to suppress fugitive criminals is especially im-
portant between Canada and the United States. The ease of
travel between the two countries' 44 has made the Extradition
Treaty crucial "to secure the return of . . . fugitives" to Ca-
nada. 145  Were it not for extradition laws, Canadian cities
"would be ready targets for [United States] criminals if the
United States were not under obligation to surrender
them." 146
The Extradition Treaty is very specific concerning the
types of offenses exempt from extradition: those of a "political
character,"'' 47 those barred by lapse of time,' 48 and those for
accused . . . to ultimately answer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in
which he shall be finally tried upon the charge made against him.
Id.
141. I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (1971).
142. See Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925) (discussing the natural
anxiety of an American being sent to Mexico for trial of a crime allegedly covered by
the United States' extradition treaty with Mexico).
143. J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 6-7
(1891) (footnote omitted).
144. "[M]odernization of the extradition relations between the United States
and Canada is especially important in light of the ease of travel between the two
countries." The Presidents Message, supra note 24.
145. G.V. LAFOREST, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA 121 (1961).
146. Id.
147. Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(l)(iii). The political offense excep-
tion provides that:
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which the person has already been tried. 4 9 No other exemp-
tions from extradition are recognized. 50 The controversy over
Extradition shall not be granted .. .[w]hen the offense in respect of which
extradition is requested is of a political character, or the person whose ex-
tradition is requested proves that the extradition request has been made for
the purpose of trying or punishing him for an offense of the above-men-
tioned character. If any question arises as to whether a case comes within
the provisions of this subparagraph, the authorities of the Government on
which the requisition is made shall decide.
Id.
Offenses of a political character are not easily defined. G.V. LAFOREST, supra
note 145, at 44. They must be considered in the context in which they have been
committed. Id. However, there are some guidelines which may be followed. Id.
Offenses of a political character often arise out of political disturbances, such as
a political uprising. Id. But not every crime committed during a political uprising will
be considered a political offense. Id. at 45. The act must have been committed "as
an incident or in furtherance of a political end." Id. Thus, if a shooting occurred
during a political uprising, but was motivated by private revenge, extradition could
not be waived on the ground that the offense was one of a political character. Id. It is
not necessary, though, that the offense take place as a result of a political uprising.
Id. In Ex Parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540, seven crew members of a Polish fishing
vessel overpowered the captain and other crew members and brought the ship into
an English port. Id. at 542-43. Their purpose-was to seek asylum in England so that
they could avoid being charged with certain political crimes. Id. Although they had
committed acts, such as kidnapping, which would otherwise be extraditable under
Great Britain's extradition treaty with Poland, these offenses were judged to be of a
political character. G.V. LAFOREST, supra note 145, at 47.
148. Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(l)(ii). "Extradition shall not be
granted . .. [w]hen the prosecution for the offense has become barred by lapse of
time according to the laws of the requesting State." Id.
149. Id. art. 4(l)(i). "Extradition shall not be granted .. .[w]hen the person
whose surrender is sought is being proceeded against, or has been tried and dis-
charged or punished in the territory of the requested State for the offense for which
his extradition is requested." Id.
150. The ruling of the court is not the final word however. The powers of the
Secretary of State in regard to extradition proceedings are expressed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3186 (1976), which reads:
The Secretary of State may order the person committed under sections
3184 or 3185 of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such
foreign government, to be tried for the offense of which charged. Such
agent may hold such person in custody, and take him to the territory of such
foreign government, pursuant to such treaty. A person so accused who es-
capes may be retaken in the same manner as any person accused of any
offense.
Id.
The words "may order the person committed" have been construed as giving
the Secretary of State the "discretion to refuse to extradite." See Escobedo v. United
States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1036 (1980), cert.
denied sub nom. Castillo v. Forsht, United States Marshal, 450 U.S. 922 (1981). The
Secretary of State has "the authority to review the proceedings and evidence taken
before the committing magistrate with a view to determining in general whether
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Jaffe's kidnapping had already threatened "to have a generally
deleterious effect on [the United States'] relations with Ca-
nada."'' If the court permitted Kear to escape extradition
when there was ample evidence to commit him for trial, 52 the
integrity of the United States' extradition agreement with Ca-
nada could have been seriously eroded. 53 Canada has been
"scrupulously cooperative in complying with [United States]
requests for the extradition of fugitives."'' 54 The United States
cannot give any less in return.
under all the circumstances affecting the case, both of a public and private nature, the
warrant of surrender should issue." Memorandum from Chandler P. Anderson,
Counselor of the Department of State, to Secretary of State Knox (Feb. 5, 1912)
(Department of State file 211.42R67/16), reprinted in M. WHITEMAN, supra note 45, at
1027.
It is noted that there are treaties which give the courts broader discretion in
deciding when extradition is not warranted. Extradition treaties negotiated by the
United States with Norway, Treaty on Extradition, June 9, 1977, United States-Nor-
way, art. 7(2)(b), 31 U.S.T. 5621, 5626, T.I.A.S. No. 9679, at 7-8 [hereinafter cited as
Norway Treaty], and with Finland, Treaty on Extradition, June 11, 1976, United
States-Finalnd, art. 7(l)(c), 31 U.S.T. 944, 950, T.I.A.S. No. 9626, at 7 [hereinafter
cited as Finland Treaty], provide that extradition "may be refused ... [if] in special
circumstances, having particular regard to the age, health, or personal conditions of
the person concerned, the requested State has reason to believe that extradition will
be incompatible with humanitarian considerations." Norway Treaty, supra, art.
7(2)(a); Finland Treaty, supra, art. 7(l)(c). The Treaty on Extradition Between the
United States and Denmark, June 22, 1972, United States-Denmark, art. 7(5), 25
U.S.T. 1293, 1301, T.I.A.S. No. 7864, at 9, has the same exception, but is stated in
stronger language. The phrase "shall not be granted" rather than "may be refused"
is used to preface the provision. Id. Perhaps the most liberal exception is provided
in the Convention on Extradition Between the United States and Sweden, Oct. 24,
1961, United States-Sweden, art. V(6), 14 U.S.T. 1845, 1849, T.I.A.S. No. 5496, at 5.
This agreement states that:
Extradition shall not be granted . . .[i]f in the specific case it is found to be
obviously incompatible with the requirements of humane treatment, be-
cause of, for example, the youth or health of the person sought, taking into
account also the nature of the offense and the interest of the requesting
State.
Id.
151. Strasser, A One-Man Diplomatic Flap, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 1983, at 28 (quot-
ing Secretary of State George Shultz). Secretary of State George Shultz "warned that
all the sniping 'threatens to have a generally deleterious effect on [the United States']
relations with Canada.' " Id.
152. See supra notes 48-82 and accompanying text.
153. See Posner, Handcuffs across the border, Maclean's, July 25, 1983, at 7 (discuss-
ing the effects of Florida's alleged refusal to retrievejaffe by following procedures set
out in the Extradition Treaty).
154. Putnam County vs. Canada, Time, Aug. 8, 1983, at 58.
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CONCLUSION
The events leading up to the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Kear v. Hilton were highly dramatic. The kidnapping of a
prominent Canadian businessman by two United States bounty
hunters provided sensational newspaper and magazine head-
lines. However, the Kear court was correct in not letting the
resulting furor obscure its analysis of the issues before it.
There is no doubt that, on its face, Kear's conduct violated
both the Canadian and United States kidnapping statutes. 55
Under the terms of the Extradition Treaty, this is sufficient for
extradition.' 56 Kear, buttressed by the powers given bounty
hunters in the United States 157 and the possible approval of
state officials, 158 portrayed himself as having believed he was
acting lawfully.' 59 However, as far back as 1931, the Fourth
Circuit had ruled that such a defense was not enough to pre-
vent extradition when the evidence indicated that an extradita-
ble crime had been committed.1 6' Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has stated that a writ of habeas corpus may not be used
to frustrate extradition when the evidence is sufficient for com-
mittal for trial.' 6 1
Finally, a principal reason for creating the Extradition
Treaty was to prevent fugitive criminals from taking advantage
of the ease of travel between Canada and the United States by
committing a crime in one country and then fleeing to the
other. 62 The Extradition Treaty is very specific in its excep-
tions. 1 63 Whatever the merits of Kear's defense may be, 1 64 it
did not fall under one of the exceptions. The sincerity of the
United States' interest in furthering the goals of the Extradi-
tion Treaty could have come under serious question if the Kear
court had not decided in favor of extradition. The decision
was mandated not only by prior case law and by the terms of
155. See supra notes 44 & 51.
156. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
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the Extradition Treaty, but by the policy of cooperation be-
tween Canada and the United States that is essential to the Ex-
tradition Treaty.
John A. Hyland
